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The Moral Apocalypse in Koji Suzuki’s  Ring  
Dr Steve Jones  
The ďooŵ iŶ JapaŶese hoƌƌoƌ͛s iŶteƌŶatioŶal populaƌitǇ is ǁidelǇ ƌeĐogŶized  
as beginning with Ringu (1998, Japan) (McRoy 91; Harper 7 and 113), the 
influence of which continues to resonate in remakes of J-horror successes.
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Ring͛s popularity is testified to by its numerous spin-offs, sequels, and adap-
tations.
2
 Despite being at the core of this explosion, the underlying origin 
point—Koji Suzuki͛s Ŷoǀel Ring (1991)—has received virtually no scholarly 
attention. The basic story is retained across the novel and its adaptations. 
At its center is a journalist investigating a cursed video, which is rumored to 
cause its viewer to die mysteriously exactly seven days after watching it.  On 
seeing the video, the journalist enlists a familiar acquaintance to help 
uncoveƌ the tape͛s oƌigiŶs. TheǇ uŶeaƌth the histoƌǇ of Sadako, a psǇĐhiĐ giƌl  
ǁho ǁas thƌoǁŶ iŶto a ǁell to die. The ƌepoƌteƌ eǆposes Sadako͛s ŵuƌdeƌ 
and believes discovering her body has lifted the video-curse. When their 
acquaintance dies, the journalist realizes that the only means of stopping 
the curse is to copy the videotape and show it to someone else, thus propa-
gating its effects. 
Those consistencies are coupled with some notable differences between 
  
Suzuki͛s Ŷoǀel aŶd its filŵiĐ adaptatioŶs. The feŵale-male investigative duo 
found in each film version of  Ring was originally envisaged by Suzuki as a 
male pair composed of a journalist, Asakawa, and his closest friend, Ryuji,  
who asserts that he is a rapist. Although doubt is cast over his proclamation  
iŶ the Ŷoǀel͛s ĐlosiŶg stages, ‘Ǉuji͛s deĐlaƌatioŶ shapes his ƌelatioŶship ǁith  
Asakaǁa, ŵeaŶiŶg theiƌ ďoŶd is teŶse fƌoŵ the outset. Fuƌtheƌŵoƌe, Sadako͛s  
sexuality is emphasized in the novel, not least since she may have been 
raped by her doctor (Nagao) ďefoƌe ďeiŶg ŵuƌdeƌed. Moƌeoǀeƌ, Sadako͛s 
body is subject to sexual scrutiny since s=he is revealed to be hermaphroditic 
in the novel. 
However, other striking differences arise from the social themes that drive 
Suzuki͛s Ŷoǀel. The filŵ ǀeƌsioŶs ďlaŵe the ǀideo aŶd Sadako͛s ŵalevolence 
foƌ the deaths that oĐĐuƌ. OŶ the suƌfaĐe, it appeaƌs that Suzuki͛s Ŷoǀel is 
also focused on Sadako as the Đuƌse͛s Đause siŶĐe lead pƌotagoŶist Asakaǁa 
speŶds the ŵajoƌitǇ of the Ŷoǀel iŶǀestigatiŶg the ǀideo͛s oƌigiŶs aŶd 
Sadako͛s histoƌǇ, seekiŶg to disĐoǀeƌ ǁhetheƌ the Đuƌse is ďiologiĐal oƌ 
supernatural. His failure to find a solution indicates that this is Ŷot the Ŷoǀel͛s 
poiŶt. Suzuki͛s Ŷoǀel is ĐoŶĐeƌŶed ǁith a figuƌatiǀe soĐial ĐƌitiƋue. The 
Ŷoǀel͛s ĐeŶtƌal ĐoŶĐeit is a ŵoƌal dileŵŵa. Afteƌ ǁatĐhiŶg the Đuƌsed ǀideo,  
one has to copy the tape and show it to someone else, condemning him or 
her in order to save oneself. The curse itself is not as terrifying as its antidote:  
Asakaǁa͛s ǁilliŶgŶess to spƌead the Đuƌse ƌegaƌdless of the poteŶtial 
consequences. 
Asakawa envisages his decision to condemn others as leading to a literal  
apoĐalǇpse. He ƌealizes that he ͚͚ĐaŶ saǀe ŵaŶkiŶd͛͛ ;ϯϲϲͿ ďǇ saĐƌifiĐiŶg his  
faŵilǇ, ďut Đhooses iŶstead to ͚͚let loose oŶ the ǁoƌld a plague ǁh ich could 
  
 
destƌoǇ all ŵaŶkiŶd͛͛ ;ϯϲϱͿ. Although ŵoƌe deaths ǁill eŶsue as a ƌesult of his  
actions, Asakawa over-compensates in fretting that he will trigger the end of 
the ǁoƌld. Asakaǁa͛s guilt suggests that he ĐaŶŶot eǀade feeliŶg ŵoƌallǇ 
responsible for intentionally dooming others. Yet this fee l ing  of personal 
ƌespoŶsiďilitǇ is ǀital siŶĐe it ƌeǀeals the Đuƌse͛s sǇŵďoliĐ fuŶĐtioŶ. MoǀiŶg 
between objective narration and subjective view-points, from the minutiae 
of ǀiƌal iŶfeĐtioŶ to the ͚͚apoĐalǇptiĐ͛͛ future consequences, the narrative 
dramatizes the cost of engaging in systemic violence from a personalized 
perspective. Asakawa is an allegorical conduit, a figure through which Suzuki  
can explore the limits of moral obligation and intersubjectivity.  
R ing  is theƌefoƌe a paƌaďle of soĐial ƌespoŶsiďilitǇ. Sadako͛s Đuƌse ŵaǇ ďe a 
ĐatalǇst, ďut the Ŷoǀel͛s tƌue taƌgets aƌe the foƌŵs of soĐial siĐkŶess— rape, 
murder, self-interest—that pƌiǀilege the self at the Otheƌ͛s eǆpeŶse. SuĐh 
behaviors, the narrative proposes, must be transformed or eradicated 
ďeĐause theǇ aƌe Đauses of soĐial iŶstaďilitǇ. Suzuki͛s Ŷoǀel eǆposes the 
duties and potential frailties that underpin interdependency.  Ring͛s populace 
is dysfunctional precisely because its members lack moral obligation to one 
aŶotheƌ. The Ŷoǀel͛s allegoƌǇ poiŶts toǁaƌds the iŶeǀitaďilitǇ of a tƌaŶsitioŶ 
fƌoŵ egoisŵ to iŶteƌsuďjeĐtiǀitǇ. Asakaǁa͛s feaƌ of apoĐalǇpse ƌepƌeseŶts 
the impact this evolution would have on the self from the perspective of an 
egoistic self threatened by that change. The apocalypse motif illustrates the 
gravity of moral obligation in forming the self. Suzuki dramatizes the 
pressures of moral obligation and the inexorable transition into full selfhood 
via his protagonists. 
In this sense, Ring͛s apocalyptic overtones require dissection. Some critics 
have characterized Japanese horror of the last twenty years as being bleak or 
  
nihilistic, particularly because it frequently utilizes apocalyptic imagery (see, 
for instance, Napier 338 and Berriman 75). However, the use of the term 
͚͚apoĐalǇptiĐ͛͛ is pƌoďleŵatiĐ iŶ this ĐoŶteǆt. Chƌistopheƌ Shaƌƌett, foƌ 
eǆaŵple, has eǆpƌessed a ĐoŶĐeƌŶ oǀeƌ the ͚͚populaƌ ŵisuse of apoĐalǇpse 
Ŷot as ƌeǀelatioŶ ďut dooŵsdaǇ, disasteƌ, the eŶd͛͛ (4). Apocalypse correctly 
signifies a zero-leveling born out of an unsatisfactory or unstable present. 
This transformation need not be negative since the apocalypse-fantasy 
con-notes the opportunity to rebuild society, to make it better.  Ring͛s 
populace is constituted by profoundly self-interested individuals whose 
attitudes are closer to solipsism than intersubjectivity. Ring͛s apocalypse 
warns that this state is unsustainable because it damages the self. What is at 
stake iŶ Asakaǁa͛s ĐhoiĐe is total destruction, or at least this is how he 
perceives it. To the reader, the solution is clear. If no one copied the tape, 
there would be no further harm. The novel thus implies that 
interdependency is a solution to the malevolence haunting the diegetic 
public. Sadako is not the real threat: it is self-interest that plagues Ring͛s 
populace. 
IŶ oƌdeƌ to eǆploƌe these theŵes aŶd Suzuki͛s allegoƌiĐal ŵode, this aƌtiĐle 
ǁill eŵploǇ LeǀiŶas͛s ethiĐal philosophǇ as a poiŶt of ĐoŵpaƌisoŶ. The 
comparison highlights what pƌeĐiselǇ Suzuki͛s Ŷoǀel ĐoŶtƌiďutes to the 





Moral Obligation, Intersubjectivity, Levinas 
Philosophy has a long history of accounting for how moral codes arise, and 
the ƌelatioŶships ďetǁeeŶ ŵoƌalitǇ aŶd ͚͚ƌightŶess͛͛ oƌ ͚͚ǁƌoŶgŶess.͛͛ LeǀiŶas  
was interested in the former—how morality arises and defines us—more 
than the latter. Principally, Levinas proposed that morality underpins  
self-conception. He contended that moral obligation is a consequence of 
sociality. In fact, for Levinas, self-conception is contingent on moral 
obligation to Others. These emphases on morality, sociality, and obligation 
make LeǀiŶas͛s philosophǇ paƌtiĐulaƌlǇ apt iŶ ĐoŶsideƌiŶg Suzuki͛s soĐial 
critique.  
For Levinas, morality arises in conjunctioŶ ǁith the iŶdiǀidual͛s deǀelopment 
into subjectivity. In his view, we develop selfhood only when we become 
aware of an Other; when we recognize that other people exist  and relate to 
the world as we do. We initially experience the world as ours. At this stage, 
ǁe aƌe, as LeǀiŶas͛s eaƌlǇ philosophǇ phƌases it, siŵplǇ egoistiĐ.  It is only when 
we realize that the world is not ours a l o n e  that we develop into 
subjectivity. Two implications follow: first, we come to realize that our 
experience is preceded by and will be succeeded by the existence of other 
people. It is this sense of a l l  other people, literally present before us or 
otherǁise, that is ĐoŶŶoted iŶ ĐapitaliziŶg ͚͚Otheƌ.͛͛ SeĐoŶd, ǁe deǀelop into an 
͚͚I͛͛ that is diffeƌeŶtiated fƌoŵ the Otheƌ ;͚͚Ŷot-I͛͛Ϳ. IdeŶtitǇ is theƌefoƌe 
contingent oŶ the Otheƌ siŶĐe ǁe ƌeƋuiƌe a ͚͚Ŷot-I͛͛ iŶ oƌdeƌ to distiŶguish the 
͚͚I.͛͛3 In that sense, we are defined as social entities since we can only define 
identity under the conditions of sociality. Subjectivity is always-already 
intersubjectivity. Both implications conjoin on the point that we are not 
sovereign entities. Egoistic experience of the world is a mistake that is 
  
ĐoƌƌeĐted ďǇ the Otheƌ͛s presence. Moreover, because self is contingent on 
the Other who experieŶĐes the ǁoƌld as ͚͚I͛͛ do aŶd laǇs at least eƋual Đlaiŵ 
to the world, each person is morally obliged to the Other. In fact, because 
Others are a priori and a posteriori, the self is always secondary to the Other. 
Ethics is synonyŵous ǁith this ͚͚ƌespoŶsiďilitǇ-of-one-person-for-the-otheƌ͛͛ 
(Levinas, Outside 42) since subjectivity is contingent on the subject accepting 
obligations that they did not create. 
LeǀiŶas is so peƌtiŶeŶt iŶ the ĐoŶteǆt of this aƌtiĐle ďeĐause Suzuki͛s soĐial 
critique draws out similar obligations to the Other, testing them via a series 
of tensions. First, Ring establishes that intersubjectivity is simultaneously 
ŶeĐessaƌǇ aŶd fƌagile. Foƌ eǆaŵple, Asakaǁa Ŷeeds ‘Ǉuji͛s help to lift the 
curse, yet Asakawa is also willing to sacrifice Ryuji in order to survive. The 
characters have to choose whether their short-term, immediate interests in 
self-pƌeseƌǀatioŶ aŶd theiƌ loǀed oŶes͛ suƌǀiǀal take pƌeĐedeŶĐe oǀeƌ theiƌ 
moral obligation to Otheƌs. This is, as Vaƌga posits, ͚͚oŶe of the ŵost 
fundamental problems in morality: Why be moral, if being moral is not the 
ďest soƌt of life foƌ ŵe?͛͛ ;ϳϲ; see also PauleǇ ϵϳ aŶd BatsoŶ et al. 1190). The 
answer, for Levinas, is that ethics begins with the Other, a pƌioƌi ͚͚I.͛͛ Since 
Levinas was more interested in ethics relative to experience than in the 
practical application of morals, he skims over the emotive impact obligation 
has on the self. In contrast, that emotive impact is central to  Ring. 
Suzuki and Levinas share the view that moral obligation is a fundamental 
source of pressure. They also concur that human experience plays a crucial 
role in uncovering those tensions. Yet Suzuki and Levinas diverge in their 
appƌoaĐhes. LeǀiŶas͛s pƌojeĐt iŶ eǆplaining the relationships between 
here-and-Ŷoǁ eǆpeƌieŶĐe aŶd ethiĐs is to deďuŶk oŶtologǇ. LeǀiŶas͛s Đoŵ -
  
 
mitment to self-Otheƌ ƌelatioŶs ŵeaŶs the ͚͚I͛͛ is pƌopeƌlǇ ĐoŶĐeiǀed of as an 
͚͚I-Thou of dialogue͛͛ ǁith the Otheƌ, Ŷot aŶ ͚͚I-it,͛͛ aŶ oďjeĐt iŶ the ǁorld 
(Outside ϯϱͿ. LeǀiŶas͛s self is pheŶoŵeŶologiĐal; that is, he is foĐused oŶ 
ĐoŶsĐiousŶess. Suzuki, oŶ the otheƌ haŶd, uses pƌotagoŶists͛ eǆpeƌieŶĐes to 
critique social relations. 
Ring͛s critique of social dysfunction employs the self=Other separation at key 
points to question the nature of social interaction and moral obligation. In 
the Ŷoǀel͛s Đliŵaǆ, aŶd haǀiŶg failed to fiŶd a Đuƌe foƌ the ǀideo -curse, Ryuji 
eǆpiƌes. At this ŵoŵeŶt, it ƌeǀealed ǁhǇ the ǀideo͛s ǀiĐtiŵs die of puƌe 
fright. As he looks at hiŵself, he sees that ͚͚[t]he faĐe iŶ the ŵiƌƌoƌ ǁas ŶoŶe 
other than his own, a hundred years in the future. Even ‘Ǉuji hadŶ͛t kŶoǁŶ it 
would be so terrifying to meet himself transformed into soŵeoŶe else͛͛ ;ϯϰϰͿ. 
The exteriorization and transformation of the self into an Other is clearly 
designated as the ultimate unimaginable horror. In this instance, it is clear 
that Suzuki shaƌes LeǀiŶas͛s ĐoŶĐeptioŶ of the ͚͚I͛͛ ďeiŶg  defined by its 
diffeƌeŶĐe fƌoŵ ͚͚Ŷot-I.͛͛ WheŶ ‘Ǉuji ĐaŶŶot oƌieŶt hiŵself as  ͚͚I,͛͛ he 
perceives himself as Other. That move leads to his eradication. He  dies of 
fright because his self-conception crumbles. 
This horror is rooted in the video-Đuƌse that Đlaiŵs ‘Ǉuji͛s life. ‘Ǉuji dies 
because he saw the video but failed to copy it and show it to someone else.  
The Đuƌse͛s ͚͚ƌules͛͛ liteƌalize ŵoƌal oďligatioŶ as a dileŵŵa. The self  can 
suƌǀiǀe oŶlǇ ďǇ ĐhoosiŶg to ǀaŶƋuish the Otheƌ. IŶ ‘Ǉuji͛s Đase, ďeĐause the 
instructions had been removed from the copy he was exposed to, he did 
not know how to resolve the curse. His death is nevertheless haunted by 
the interconnection of self and Other in the imagery Suzuki employs. 
FolloǁiŶg ‘Ǉuji͛s death, Asakaǁa ƌealizes ǁhat ŵust ďe doŶe to saǀe hiŵself.  
  
His ƌeǀelatioŶ is eƋuallǇ iŵďued ǁith the ethos that ͚͚the eŶĐouŶteƌ ǁith the  
Other is my responsibility for him . . . taking upon oneself the  fate of the 
otheƌ͛͛ ;LeǀiŶas, Entre 88). Asakawa perceives his choice to condemn an= 
Other as the apocalypse.
4
 IŶ paƌallel to the iŵpliĐatioŶ of OtheƌŶess iŶ ‘Ǉuji͛s  
death, Asakawa envisages his decision to self-preserve as the destruction of 
everything .  The Otheƌ͛s suƌǀiǀal is piǀotal to eǆisteŶĐe.  
This is ǁheƌe Suzuki͛s ĐhaƌaĐteƌ-led drama explores moral obligation in a 
ŵaŶŶeƌ LeǀiŶas does Ŷot. Asakaǁa͛s eŵotiǀe ƌespoŶse plaǇs out ǁhat 
LeǀiŶas oŶlǇ hǇpothesizes ǁheŶ he states that ͚͚if theƌe ǁeƌe Ŷo oƌde r of 
justiĐe, theƌe ǁould ďe Ŷo liŵit to ŵǇ ƌespoŶsiďilitǇ͛͛  (Entre 90). Although 
everyone has the right to defend their own life and may be emotionally 
dƌaǁŶ to pƌioƌitize theiƌ loǀed oŶes͛ ǁelfaƌe oǀeƌ otheƌs͛, to do so is ŵoƌallǇ  
problematic since it involves intentionally condemning others to death.
5
 
Despite being understandable, Asakawa apprehends that his choice to dis -
tribute the tape in order to preserve himself and his immediate loved ones 
is morally unjustifiable. The imbalance between saving his family and con-
demning humankind is overwhelming for Asakawa. That disproportion is 
reflected in the apocalypse that he perceives as resulting from his decision.  
The apocalypse Asakawa envisions is thus not the erasure of the Other that  
would divest him of obligation. Rather, destroying the Other also means 
eradicating the self. His decision to condemn another dooms him, too, since  
he is always-alƌeadǇ soŵeoŶe else͛s Otheƌ. Suzuki͛s apoĐalǇpse is thus sǇs-
temic in nature, calling into question the relationship and balance between 
self and Other. 
The apocalypse is not a purely destructive in the novel, however. Suzuki  uses 
apocalyptic threat to productively question social relations, pointing 
  
 
towards the possibility of something more. Since the apocalypse is rooted 
in conflict between self and Other—the negation of responsibility for the 
Other—it could be resolved by embracing full, ethical obligation to the 
Otheƌ. It is Ŷot the apoĐalǇpse ďut ƌatheƌ the pƌotagoŶists͛ flaǁed attitudes 
towards moral obligation that threaten to destroy the world. As Suzuki 
demonstrates, it is not only Asakawa who exhibits this flaw. His attitude is 
representative, resonating in all of  Ring͛s social interactions. Understanding 
Suzuki͛s soĐial ĐƌitiƋue alloǁs us to fuƌtheƌ gƌasp  Ring͛s value as a 
philosophical project. 
 
The Horror of  Social Commitment  
Rin g ͛s soĐial ĐƌitiƋue is fouŶded oŶ its allegoƌiĐal pƌotagoŶist. Asakaǁa͛s peƌ -
spective dominates the novel, yet his morally flawed choices are indicative of  
much broader problems, all of which are implicated as contributing to the 
poteŶtial ͚͚apoĐalǇpse.͛͛ While LeǀiŶas disŵisses the possiďilitǇ of solipsistiĐ  
human existence since subjectivity is contingent on sociality, Suzuki portrays a 
society constituted by emotionally divorced individuals. Despite their evi -
dentlǇ diffeƌiŶg appƌoaĐhes, Suzuki shaƌes LeǀiŶas͛s appƌeheŶsioŶ that this 
situatioŶ is uŶteŶaďle. Suzuki͛s poƌtƌaǇal of soĐial alieŶatioŶ illustƌates the 
horrifying consequences of people negating their obligation to one another.  
The video-curse relies on the individual forsaking Others in favor of his or her 
personal well-being. Rather than causing people to become asocial, however, 
this curse arises out of, and therefore is indicative of, social flaws that 
pre-exist the video. To that end, the novel revels iŶ its populaĐe͛s 
  
self-iŶteƌested attitudes siŶĐe theǇ pƌoǀide ŵuĐh of the teǆt͛s hoƌƌoƌ. 
Incidental characters such as Kimura, who only makes a brief appearance in 
the opening, are present to demonstrate that self-interestedness is pervas-
ive. When a motoƌĐǇĐlist Đollapses oŶto Kiŵuƌa͛s taǆi, Kiŵuƌa is iŶitiallǇ oŶlǇ  
ĐoŶĐeƌŶed aďout the sĐƌatĐh oŶ his ǀehiĐle, Ŷot the ƌideƌ͛s spasŵs ;ϭϮͿ. 
PƌeseŶtiŶg suĐh flagƌaŶt disƌegaƌd foƌ aŶotheƌ͛s suffeƌiŶg so eaƌlǇ iŶ the Ŷoǀel  
establishes that self-interest is a diegetic social norm. 
At its most extreme points, the novel presents interaction as outright dis-
ĐoŶŶeĐtioŶ. This is ŵost pƌofouŶdlǇ ŵaŶifested iŶ Suzuki͛s seǆual iŵageƌǇ. 
Foƌ eǆaŵple, the iŶstaŶĐe of tǁo teeŶ ǀiĐtiŵs ͚͚gettiŶg ƌeadǇ to do it͛͛ ;ϰϭͿ is 
ƌeǀeƌsed ďǇ the Đuƌse. TheǇ aƌe fouŶd ͚͚pƌessed up agaiŶst the dooƌs, as if 
theǇ ǁeƌe tƌǇiŶg to get as faƌ aǁaǇ fƌoŵ eaĐh otheƌ as theǇ Đould͛͛ ;ϰϮͿ. Their 
assignation—which should signal their intimate connection—becomes a 
moment of terrifying separation. Elsewhere, the violence of such a reversal  is 
eǆpliĐitlǇ ĐoŶŶeĐted to the looŵiŶg apoĐalǇpse. ‘Ǉuji ĐoŶĐeiǀes of Sadako͛s 
curse as a kind of anti-ďiƌth. He ƌealizes that Sadako ͚͚ǁaŶted to haǀe a 
Đhild,͛͛ ďut ďeĐause heƌ heƌŵaphƌoditiĐ ͚͚ďodǇ ĐouldŶ͛t ďeaƌ oŶe,͛͛ the 
ǀiĐtiŵs of heƌ Đuƌse ďeĐoŵe heƌ ͚͚ĐhildƌeŶ͛͛ iŶstead ;ϯϰϯͿ. The Đuƌse is 
characterized as a form of auto-propagation that detracts from rather than 
eŶsuƌes the populaĐe͛s gƌoǁth. ‘Ǉuji͛s oǁŶ ŵisaŶthƌopiĐ ͚͚dƌeams for the 
futuƌe͛͛ fuƌtheƌ ĐoŶŶeĐt the looŵiŶg apoĐalǇpse ǁith seǆualized asoĐialitǇ: 
͚͚[ǁ]hile ǀieǁiŶg the eǆtiŶĐtioŶ of the huŵaŶ ƌaĐe fƌoŵ the top of a hill, I 
ǁould dig a hole iŶ the eaƌth aŶd ejaĐulate iŶto it oǀeƌ aŶd oǀeƌ͛͛ ;ϭϭϳͿ. 
‘Ǉuji͛s seǆual ƌevelry—ǁhiĐh ĐleaƌlǇ ĐoŶŶotes ͚͚fuĐk the Eaƌth͛͛—is markedly 
solitary. These powerful sexual images have a significant impact on  Ring͛s 
tone. They are spread across the novel, meaning comparisons are regularly 
  
 
drawn between social disconnection and the apocalyptic violence it signals.  
Given his apocalypse-masturbation fantasy, it is unsurprising that Ryuji is the 
Ŷoǀel͛s ŵisaŶthƌopiĐ ŵouthpieĐe, ĐoŶĐƌetiziŶg the populaĐe͛s peƌǀas ive 
pƌoďleŵs. His attitude is suŵŵated iŶ his deĐlaƌatioŶ that ͚͚all those idiots  
who prattle on about world peace and the survival of humanity make me 
puke͛͛ ;ϭϭϳͿ. This seŶtiŵeŶt—ǁhiĐh ŵaƌks hiŵ as ͚͚highlǇ iŶdiǀidualistiĐ͛͛  (1 
19)—leads Asakaǁa to uŶdeƌestiŵate theiƌ soĐial ďoŶd: ͚͚[h]e suddeŶlǇ felt  
himself wondering, like he always did, just why he was friends with this guǇ͛͛ 
(121). Asakawa then uses that position to justify showing Ryuji the tape,  
ƌatioŶaliziŶg, ͚͚[ǁ]hat do I Đaƌe if ‘Ǉuji eŶds up dead? SoŵeoŶe ǁho saǇs he  
ǁaŶts to ǁatĐh the eǆtiŶĐtioŶ of ŵaŶkiŶd doesŶ͛t deseƌǀe to liǀe a loŶg life͛͛  
(122–2ϯͿ. Although deeplǇ uŶsouŶd, Asakaǁa aŶd ‘Ǉuji͛s fƌieŶdship is the 
stƌoŶgest soĐial ďoŶd that the Ŷoǀel offeƌs. Despite Asakaǁa͛s appaƌeŶt 
devotion to his family—foƌ ǁhoŵ he ǁould ƌisk huŵaŶitǇ͛s futuƌe ǁhoŵ— 
he cannot relate to them. He instead defers to an outsider, characterizing 
‘Ǉuji as ͚͚the outlet foƌ all the eŵotioŶs he ĐouldŶ͛t ďƌeakdoǁŶ aŶd shoǁ his 
ǁife͛͛ ;ϭϴϱͿ. It is oŶlǇ afteƌ ‘Ǉuji is dead that Asakaǁa ĐoŵpƌeheŶds that  his 
fƌieŶd gaǀe up eǀeƌǇthiŶg to help hiŵ ;ϯϱϲͿ. Asakaǁa͛s ƌelatioŶships iŶdicate 
that even the most pivotal points of interconnection—family and friends—do 
not provide the social connectivity they ought to here. Indeed, they are 
ultimately associated with destruction. 
Despite Asakaǁa͛s flaǁed ƌelatioŶships, his ǁoƌldǀieǁ is faƌ less overtly 
asoĐial thaŶ ‘Ǉuji͛s. Hoǁeǀeƌ, it is just as teƌƌifǇiŶg. EaƌlǇ iŶ the Ŷoǀel, 
Asakaǁa ƌefleĐts that it ͚͚felt like it had ďeeŶ a loŶg tiŵe siŶĐe he͛d seeŶ 
aŶotheƌ huŵaŶ ďeiŶg, aŶd soŵethiŶg ǁithiŶ hiŵ ǁaŶted to talk͛͛ ;ϳϴͿ. Afteƌ 
watching the video, his iŶstiŶĐts aƌe iŵŵediatelǇ soĐial iŶ iŶteŶt; ͚͚peeƌiŶg 
  
aƌouŶd the ƌooŵ iŶ eǀeƌǇ diƌeĐtioŶ. . . he didŶ͛t ƌealize that he ǁas tƌǇiŶg to 
look pathetiĐ, to dƌaǁ sǇŵpathǇ,͛͛ eǀeŶ though he ǁas aloŶe ;ϭϬϵͿ. His 
desire for social contact highlights the interdependence on which subjectivity 
is founded. However, his social experiences contrast with that desire. For 
eǆaŵple, ǁheŶ Asakaǁa͛s daughteƌ thƌoǁs a taŶtƌuŵ iŶ puďliĐ, it is stated 
that ͚͚the aĐĐusiŶg staƌes of the otheƌ passeŶgeƌs alǁaǇs ŵade [Asakawa] feel 
like he ǁas ĐhokiŶg͛͛ ;ϱϯͿ. This iŶsight deŵoŶstƌates the hoƌƌifiĐ pƌessuƌe 
sociality represents within the novel. Even minor social infringements such as 
failiŶg to ĐoŶtƌol oŶe͛s Đhild aƌe hǇpeƌďolized, ďeĐoŵiŶg life-threatening. That 
same terror is lateƌ augŵeŶted ǀia oŶe of the Đuƌsed ǀideotape͛s iŵages,  
ǁhiĐh poƌtƌaǇs ͚͚a huŶdƌed huŵaŶ faĐes. EaĐh oŶe displaǇed hatƌed aŶd 
aŶiŵositǇ .... All that ĐƌitiĐisŵ, diƌeĐted ƌight at hiŵ͛͛ ;ϭϬϮ–3). This amplifi-
ĐatioŶ eǀeŶtuallǇ esĐalates iŶto Asakaǁa͛s certainty that apocalypse looms. 
Characterized in this way, obligation is a pressure that becomes increasingly  
horrific as the novel progresses. 
 
Fetish and Dis -Connection  
Asakaǁa͛s feeliŶg of distaŶĐe iŶ iŶtiŵaĐǇ ƌeĐuƌs iŶ ǀaƌious guises thƌoughout  
Ring.  IŶ the Ŷoǀel͛s eaƌliest stages, the ĐitǇ eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶt is desĐƌiďed as aŶ  
isolatiŶg spaĐe: ͚͚[n]early a hundred dwellings were crammed into each build-
ing, but most of the inhabitants had never even seen the faces of their neigh -
bors. The only proof that people lived here came at night, when windows lit  
up͛͛ ;ϯͿ. Despite depiĐtiŶg a ĐoŶflueŶĐe of iŶdiǀiduals, the ĐitǇ͛s ƌesideŶts aƌe 
divorced from one another. Their presence is evidenced only by the lights 
that speak of their existence, but which are also profoundly anonymizing. 
  
 
Moƌeoǀeƌ, Asakaǁa͛s desiƌe foƌ ĐoŵpaŶioŶship iŶ this asoĐial spheƌe is  ech-
oed in the guest-ďook he ƌeads. As he oďseƌǀes, ͚͚ǁheŶ Đouples staǇed. . . 
their entries showed it, while when single people stayed, they wrote about 
hoǁ ŵuĐh theǇ ǁaŶted a ĐoŵpaŶioŶ͛͛ ;ϵϬͿ. Like the ĐitǇsĐape  lights, these 
entries are little more than markers of presence that forge an impression of 
and desire for connectivity between the scribe and the guest -ďook͛s 
reader. Yet those markers most aptly highlight the distance between the 
two parties. 
These examples raise two important points. First, Asakaǁa͛s feeliŶgs of 
isolation are representative rather than unique. That is, he is not alone in 
feeling alone. The second point impacts the former. Both the cityscape lights  
and the guest book are fetishistic, standing in for personal interaction and 
exacerbating the distanced feeling that characterizes sociality here. More 
iŵpoƌtaŶtlǇ, that fetishisŵ is paƌalleled iŶ the Ŷoǀel͛s piǀotal ŵoƌal dileŵŵa.  
Distributing the cursed video involves distance between participants 
inasmuch as one may issue the video without meeting the victim thereby 
condemned. The video is thus a fetishistic object. Rather than being a direct  
interaction between two people—the distributor and the receiver of the 
tape—the video acts as a bridge. Those two parties only directly interact with 
the tape, not with each other. 
It may appear that this distance would ease the moral burden for the 
person disseminating the tape, since it permits the victim to remain 
faceless. As CheŶ et al. oďseƌǀe, ͚͚eǆĐhaŶges ǁith distaŶt otheƌs ;e.g., a 
stranger) are likelǇ to pƌoǀoke a ͚tƌaŶsaĐtioŶal͛ ŵiŶdset that foĐuses oŶ 
eǆĐhaŶges of iŵŵediate aŶd taŶgiďle ďeŶefits aŶd Đosts͛͛ ;ϮϱͿ. CoŶdeŵŶiŶg 
oŶe͛s loǀed ones (or oneself) instinctually seeŵs like the ŵost ͚͚iŵŵediate 
  
aŶd taŶgiďle͛͛ cost that can be avoided by copying the tape. However, as 
Asakaǁa͛s toƌŵeŶt ƌeǀeals, the tape-copier cannot escape the knowledge 
that the proĐess ǁill Đause aŶotheƌ͛s death. OďligatioŶ to the distaŶt Otheƌ, 
the novel proposes, is too great to evade. 
The video thus fails as a separating object, as is corroborated by descriptions 
of the video, which intertwine engaging with the video and bodily 
iŶĐuƌsioŶ. The pƌotagoŶists theoƌize that the ͚͚ǀideo hadŶ͛t ďeeŶ ƌeĐorded 
ďǇ a ŵaĐhiŶe. A huŵaŶ ďeiŶg͛s eǇes, eaƌs, Ŷose, toŶgue, skiŶ—all five senses 
had been used to ŵake this ǀideo͛͛ ;ϭϵϬͿ. WatĐhiŶg the ǀideo is also ĐhaƌaĐ-
teƌized as aŶ iŵŵeƌsiǀe eǆpeƌieŶĐe, pƌeseŶtiŶg the ǀieǁeƌ ǁith aŶ ͚͚iŶĐƌed -
iďle seŶse of iŵŵediaĐǇ, as if Ǉou aƌe aĐtuallǇ a paƌtiĐipatiŶg iŶ the sĐeŶe͛͛ 
(189). It is said to stimulate the viewer͛s ͚͚seŶses. . . souŶds aŶd ǀisioŶs 
appeaƌed as if [the ǀieǁeƌ ǁeƌe] suddeŶlǇ ƌeĐalliŶg theŵ͛͛ ;ϭϬϰͿ. AĐĐoƌdiŶglǇ,  
Asakaǁa ͚͚ĐouldŶ͛t shake the feeliŶg that soŵethiŶg had Đliŵďed iŶto his 
ďodǇ͛͛ after watching the video (190). The seamless blending of exterior 
description with interior monologue here attests to the connectivity necessi -
tated by the video-curse. Since making and watching the video are perceived 
as being somehow corporeal, the individual who copies the tape cannot 
for-get the Other thus condemned. The video itself refuses to let participants 
think of distribution as anything other than an intimate social interaction 
because watching the tape is so personally intrusive. Rather than assuaging 
moral guilt by creating a physical distance between the watcher and the 
copier, the video stands in for the moral obligation that exists between these 






The personal, subjective fear that characters express when watching the tape 
is externalized and reified in the act of copying the tape and willingly killing 
an=other. This is Ring͛s ĐeŶtƌal hoƌƌoƌ, oŶe that eĐhoes LeǀiŶas͛s ǀisioŶ of 
intersubjectivity. For Levinas, moral obligation is founded on murder prohib-
itioŶ siŶĐe the ͚͚I͛͛ is ĐoŶtiŶgeŶt oŶ the Otheƌ͛s a  p r i o r i  existence (Entre  145). 
Entering into (inter)subjectivity involves a shift in how one engages with the 
world. The egoistic self is consumptive in nature, integrating all it encounters 
iŶto itself, siŶĐe self is eǀeƌǇthiŶg to the egoistiĐ ͚͚I.͛͛ The Otheƌ disƌupts suĐh  
consumption because the Other cannot be assimilated into the egoistic self 
(Levinas, O t h e r w i s e  102). This disturbance is a kind of world-altering viol-
eŶĐe. Suzuki͛s desĐƌiptioŶ of ǁatĐhiŶg the ǀideo is akiŶ to that disƌuptioŶ, 
iŶǀolǀiŶg a ŶegatioŶ of the ǁatĐheƌ͛s ͚͚I.͛͛ Asakaǁa͛s pheŶoŵeŶal eǆpeƌieŶĐe  
of watching the tape entails perceiving events from Sadako ͛s seŶsoƌial peƌ-
spective. The self=Other gap is bridged, but at cost to the watcher who is dis-
placed. Ring͛s interactions are undergirded by a culmination of such 
anxieties, ultimately suggesting that entering into intersubjectivity is a violent  
upheaǀal. The apoĐalǇpse Asakaǁa pƌediĐts iŶ the Ŷoǀel͛s Đliŵaǆ is the 
logiĐal ĐoŶĐlusioŶ to that distuƌďaŶĐe. The Ŷoǀel͛s allegoƌǇ is foĐused oŶ this  
transition. 
As LeǀiŶas has it, the Otheƌ͛s pƌeseŶĐe ͚͚ďƌeaks the [egoistiĐ] sǇsteŵ͛͛ 
( E n t r e  38). This breakage is aptly apocalyptic, involving a total remapping 
of the ǁoƌld foƌ the suďjeĐt. Fƌoŵ the ego͛s  perspective, obligation to the 
Other is the end of the world since it is the end of perceiving the world as 
solely belonging to oneself. This realization is a productive rather than purely  
destƌuĐtiǀe pƌoĐess. Pƌioƌ to ƌeĐogŶiziŶg the Otheƌ͛s eǆisteŶĐe, the egoistiĐ 
  
self is divorced froŵ the ǁoƌld, ďeiŶg defiŶed ďǇ its oǁŶ ͚͚pƌotestatioŶ 
agaiŶst totalitǇ͛͛ ;LeǀiŶas, Total ity 26). The egoistic self exists in an illusory 
state of denial, then. The egoistic self may be abnegated in becoming 
inter-subjective, but this is necessary in order to ƌeĐƌeate the ͚͚I͛͛ as a full 
subject. It is exactly that kind of necessary cataclysm that  Ring depicts.  
Suzuki͛s soĐial critique and fetishistic relations portray the populace as clinging 
to solipsistic, egoistic existence that cannot be sustained. Indeed, the Ŷoǀel͛s 
fetishistic motifs demonstrate that even apparently and intentionally 
distanced engagements are nevertheless inescapably interactive. The egoistic 
populace cannot resist the apocalypse that is their movement into full 
(inter)subjectivity. 
Thus, Suzuki pƌeseŶts the apoĐalǇpse as iŶeǆoƌaďle. OŶe of the Ŷoǀel͛s 
earliest subjective statements—͚͚Toŵoko.. . ƌeseŶted the Đleaƌ skǇ͛͛ ;ϱͿ— 
finds its completion in the final iŵage of ͚͚[ď]laĐk Đlouds ŵoǀ[iŶg] eeƌilǇ 
aĐƌoss the skies. . . uŶleashiŶg soŵe apoĐalǇptiĐ eǀil͛͛ ;ϯϲϳͿ. This ďookeŶdiŶg  
leŶds aŶ aiƌ of iŶeǀitaďilitǇ to the Ŷoǀel͛s tale of soĐietal Đollapse. Sadako͛s 
life-story—which causes the curse—is revealed as a history and thus is 
iƌƌeǀeƌsiďle. The ǀideo ƌeĐoƌdiŶg is a fiǆed eĐho of Sadako͛s past ǁhiĐh ƌeso -
nates in the future, meaning the consequences seem unavoidable. Simul -
taŶeouslǇ, a gƌeat deal of the Ŷoǀel͛s ŵǇsteƌǇ plot is ĐoŶstituted ďǇ 
unraveling her life, driving Ring forward towards an apparently unpreventa-
ďle ĐessatioŶ. The saŵe is tƌue of Asakaǁa͛s self-assessment prior to even 
ǁatĐhiŶg the ǀideo. LookiŶg at his ƌefleĐtioŶ he saǁ ͚͚the faĐe of a siĐk ŵaŶ  . . . 
MaǇďe he͛d already  Đaught the ǀiƌus͛͛ ;ϴϵ, emphasis added). The audio 
snippets he then hears on the tape resound with this sense of inescapability, 
tauŶtiŶg ͚͚Ǉouƌ health. . . ďouŶd to get Ǉou͛͛ ;ϭϬϭ, ellipsis iŶ the oƌigiŶalͿ.  
  
 
Obligation to the Other thus haunts Asakawa throughout the novel. When he 
encounters that pressure, he responds by seeking to preserve his egoistic 
self-world relation. Sadako epitomizes the Other for Asakawa. He 
characterizes Otherness—and the obligation it implies—as a malevolent dis-
ease that threatens to annihilate. What Asakawa seeks to evade, but cannot 
escape, is his world being rebuilt around his obligation to the Other. His 
decision to condemn others is not therefore an outright rejection of obli -
gation, since he cannot avoid what ensues. Although Asakawa can decide to 
copy the video and thus kill others, he cannot choose whether or not he is 
morally obliged to the Other he dooms. Ethics is the groundwork of sociality 
for Suzuki, as it is for Levinas. Ethics pre-exists and is essential to the 
formation of the subject qua suďjeĐt. ‘esultaŶtlǇ, Asakaǁa͛s ĐhoiĐe to 
condemn the Other is his first step into becoming a subject. His apocalyptic 
ǀisioŶ iŵplies that he uŶdeƌstaŶds he is ǀiolatiŶg the Otheƌ͛s ƌight to eǆist. 
His guilt articulates his obligation to the Other. The apocalypse thus signifies 
his transformation into intersubjectivity. 
 
The Purposes of Allegory  
Suzuki encourages the reader to think figuratively about  Ring͛s events by 
thǁaƌtiŶg his ĐhaƌaĐteƌs͛ Ŷaƌƌoǁ, iŶfleǆiďle ǀieǁpoiŶts. The ĐhaƌaĐteƌs͛ 
attempts to understand their situation fail because they look for causal, linear 
ŵeaŶiŶgs ƌatheƌ thaŶ ďƌoadeƌ, ŵaĐƌosĐopiĐ eǆplaŶatioŶs. Asakaǁa͛s Ƌuest to  
find a cure for the video-curse is doomed because he takes the curse too 
literally. From the outset the characters incorrectly refer to the curse as a 
biological virus, yet the epidemiological explanation underlines the broader 
  
meaning: that Ring͛s horror is principally social. The curse is presented as a 
zymotic disease. That is, it is a virus that requires a populace in close contact  in 
order to spread (see Karlen 48). The characters offer comparisons between the 
video-curse and infections—such as AIDS (49, 162, 276), bubonic plague (276), 
tuberculosis (284, 255, 270), and smallpox (284, 287, 292)—that spread via 
contact. However, they fail to spot that interaction is the real concern. 
Moreover, diseases, as Nancy Cero Hollander observes, typically result in the 
eƌosioŶ of ĐoŵŵuŶitǇ liŶks, aŶd lead ĐitizeŶs to seek ͚͚self -preservation in 
isolatioŶ͛͛ ;ϭϮϯͿ. It is this latteƌ issue ǁith ǁhich Ring is concerned. It is 
noted in Ring that ͚͚a ǀiƌus usuƌps liǀiŶg stƌuĐtuƌes iŶ oƌdeƌ to ƌepƌoduĐe 
itself͛͛ ;ϯϲϭͿ, ďut heƌe ͚͚stƌuĐtuƌes͛͛ ĐoŶŶotes soĐietal sǇsteŵs ŵoƌe thaŶ iŶdi -
vidual organisms. The curse is a symptom of social dysfunction since it 
requires the will to self-preservation to propagate. The curse is not a disease, 
but rather it signifies social dis-ease. 
To understand Ring as simply as the tale of a vengeful ghost—as Verbinski 
and Nakata do in their adaptations—is to fall into the same trap of being too 
literal. The curse initially seems to belong to a category of violence that is 
͚͚eŶaĐted ďǇ soĐial ageŶts, eǀil iŶdiǀiduals,͛͛ ďut this ͚͚distƌaĐt[s]  our attention 
from [and consolidates] the true locus of trouble, by obliterating from view 
otheƌ foƌŵs of ǀioleŶĐe͛͛ ;Zizek 9). In Ring,  the ĐƌuĐial ͚͚otheƌ foƌŵ͛͛—or Other 
form—is moral responsibility. Asakawa and Ryuji are driven to ͚͚ƌesolǀe͛͛ the 
Sadako case out of necessity inasmuch as they will die if they do not. However, 
that pressure is a metaphor for intersubjective obligation. To read Sadako as 
taking vengeance out on the world is to disregard the anti -solipsistic ethos 
that pervades Ring.  
To foĐus oŶ Asakaǁa as iŶdiǀidual pƌotagoŶist is also to ŵisĐoŶstƌue Suzuki͛s 
  
 
point. Despite the narrative weight placed on Asakawa—the majority of the 
novel is aligned with his vantage point—Ring is not concerned with his 
eǆpeƌieŶĐe as aŶ iŶdiǀidual. While Asakaǁa͛s ƌole as aŶ iŶǀestigatiǀe ƌepoƌteƌ  
puts him in a unique position to drive the Ŷoǀel͛s ŵǇsteƌǇ stoƌǇ, his peƌsoŶal 
ƌespoŶse to the ǀiƌus is pƌeseŶted as tǇpiĐal. That is, despite Asakaǁa͛s foĐus  
on individual responsibility—his  desire to solve the mystery or his declaration 
that his  deĐisioŶs ͚͚ĐaŶ saǀe ŵaŶkiŶd͛͛ oƌ otheƌǁise ;ϯϲϲͿ—the problem is that 
͚͚eǀeƌǇďodǇ͛͛ ǁould do the saŵe ;ϯϲϰͿ. Asakaǁa is thus to ďe iŶteƌpƌeted as aŶ  
allegoƌiĐal figuƌe. The ĐhaƌaĐteƌ͛s peƌsoŶal ĐhoiĐes staŶd foƌ ǁhat anyone 
would do. That is, his choices articulate broader problems regarding each 
iŶdiǀidual͛s a priori responsibility for the Other. Asakawa is not simply 
justifǇiŶg his deĐisioŶ ďǇ pƌojeĐtiŶg it oŶto ͚͚eǀeƌǇďodǇ.͛͛ The Ŷaƌƌatiǀe Đoƌƌo -
borates his assessment via its self-iŶteƌested populaĐe. SiŶĐe ͚͚eǀeƌǇďodǇ͛͛ 
would condemn the Other, the entire populace is brought to a universal 
conclusion. An egoistic society must inevitably collapse in on itself.  
The allegorical mode is apt for such an exploration since its universalization 
encapsulates how we each experience the Other. We recognize that others 
claim the same relation to the world that we experience ourselves, even if 
we can never know what it is to be someone else. Engaging with the Other 
requires a kind of empathic projection, an estimation of how we might feel in 
theiƌ plaĐe. This is iŶheƌeŶt to LeǀiŶas͛s ĐoŶĐeptioŶ of the eŶd lessly negating 
self that is ĐoŶtiŶuallǇ diƌeĐted toǁaƌd ͚͚soŵethiŶg otheƌ thaŶ  ouƌselǀes͛͛ (On 
Escape 58). Moral universalization, in this view, is rooted in phenomenal 
experience, which requires that we presume all Others have commensurate 
experiences of the world.
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Suzuki uses Asakawa both as allegorical figure and as a point of emotional 
  
engagement by portraying his subjective states. This mode is  Ring͛s central 
stƌeŶgth aŶd Suzuki͛s pƌiŶĐipal ĐoŶtƌiďutioŶ to these philosophical 
discussions of selfhood and moral obligation.  Ring͛s allegory is unique 
because it dramatizes how the transformation of the egoistic self into 
iŶteƌsuďjeĐtiǀitǇ feels foƌ the ͚͚I͛͛ uŶdeƌgoiŶg that ĐhaŶge.  Ring shares many of 
LeǀiŶas͛s philosophiĐal aiŵs, Ǉet LeǀiŶas ďƌushes oǀeƌ the iŶitial stage, 
focusing his attention not on the egoistic self but on the intersubjective self 
and its relation to the Other. Levinas is concerned with outward movement, 
away from the self. He concentrates on the Other, on the conditions that 
pre-eǆist the suďjeĐt ͚͚ďefoƌe aĐtiŶg, ďefoƌe feeliŶgs,͛͛ peƌĐeiǀiŶg eŵotioŶ as 
that ǁhiĐh ͚͚shuts us up ǁithiŶ ouƌselǀes͛͛ (Entre 36, 38). Those emotions 
point away from the self for Levinas. Suzuki utilizes inward, emotional 
experience to explore the violent upheaval of becoming a subject. Ring͛s 
horror emphases the flux and how that feels and thus is emotionally engaging 
iŶ a ǁaǇ LeǀiŶas͛s philosophǇ ĐaŶŶot ďe.  
Suzuki͛s otheƌ sigŶifiĐaŶt ĐoŶtƌiďutioŶ to these deďates steŵs fƌoŵ the 
relationship between allegory and social critique in  Ring. Suzuki͛s Ŷoǀel uses 
allegory to underline that moral obligation is integral to selfhood but uses the  
horror idiom to warn that a populace motivated by self-interest is one that 
teeteƌs oŶ the ďƌiŶk of Đollapse. That uŶdeƌlǇiŶg flaǁ is the ͚͚Deǀil͛͛ that ‘Ǉu ji 
ǁaƌŶs ǁill ƌeappeaƌ ͚͚iŶ a diffeƌeŶt guise͛͛ as loŶg as huŵaŶs eǆist ;ϯϲϲ, ϮϳϲͿ.  
The Ŷoǀel͛s apoĐalǇpse pƌeseŶts this looŵiŶg disasteƌ as a situatioŶ foƌ ǁhiĐh  
everyone is personally responsible. 
In conclusion, then, Ring does not write off humanity. It points out the 
dangers of self-interest to underscore how necessary it is to remain conscious 
of ouƌ ŵoƌal oďligatioŶ to otheƌs. The Ŷoǀel͛s eŶdiŶg predicts  rather than 
  
 
depicts deǀastatioŶ, ŵeaŶiŶg that the ͚͚apoĐalǇpse͛͛ is a stage iŶ a pƌoĐess 
of becoming: that is, becoming a full subject.  Ring͛s surface tone feels 
fatalistic and the central conceit means the causal path appears to be clearly 
deliŵited: if oŶe ǁatĐhes ǀideo, oŶe dies. Hoǁeǀeƌ, the Ŷoǀel͛s soĐial 
ĐƌitiƋue is iŶteƌested iŶ the ͚͚uŶĐeƌtaiŶ futuƌe͛͛ ;ϯϲϲͿ of ĐoŵŵuŶal ƌelatioŶs. 
Asakawa͛s uŶĐeƌtaiŶtǇ oǀeƌ the futuƌe aŶd Ring͛s moral denouement leave 
the reader with a series of questions regarding selfhood, moral responsibility, 
aŶd the iŶteƌŶalizatioŶ of soĐial oďligatioŶ. The tƌue hoƌƌoƌ of Suzuki͛s stoƌǇ is 
not the ghost or the video: it is ourselves. 
 
Notes 
1. For example, Honogurai mizu no soko kara (2002, Japan) was remade as 
the American film Dark Water (2005, USA), and significantly influenced the 
plot and aesthetic of Fear (2007, India). 
2. These iŶĐlude Koji͛s seƋuel Ŷoǀels (Rasen [1995] and Rupu [1998]), and 
the many film adaptations spawned by the text; the television movie Ringu: 
Kanzen-Ban (1995, Japan), the television series Ringu: Saishusho (1999, Japan), 
the theatrical-release film adaptations Ringu (1998, Japan), Ring Virus (1999, 
Korea), and The Ring (2002, USA), as well as the sequel films Rasen (1998, 
Japan) and the TV series of the same name (Japan, 1999, both of which are 
ďased oŶ Koji Suzuki͛s folloǁ-up novel Spiral), Ringu 2 (1999, Japan, an original 
screenplay based on Ringu), and The Ring Two (2005, USA, another remake), the 
prequel Ringu 0: Basudei (2000,Japan) and Sadako3D (2012,Japan). Its influence 
is also clearly felt in subsequent Japanese horror films dealing with 
  
malevolent spirits that utilize technology as a conduit for contaminating the 
human populace, such as Chakushin Ari (2003, Japan), Gosuto Shisutemu (2002, 
Japan), and End Call (2008, Japan). 
3. Similar views are expressed by Alweiss 428; Datsur 7; Erneling 174; 
McGann and De Jaegher 427; Strawson 405. 
4. Suzuki͛s apoĐalǇptiĐ allegoƌǇ thus ŵatĐhes LeǀiŶas͛s teŶdeŶĐǇ toǁaƌds 
excess or dramatic hyperbole (Surber 295). 
5. OŶ this, see LeǀeƌiĐk͛s thoƌough disseĐtioŶ of ŵoƌalitǇ aŶd self-defense. 
6. Universalization is to be differentiated from generalization, which for 
LeǀiŶas is ͚͚death͛͛ (Entre 23). 
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